Judging in Lower Courts: Conventional, procedural, therapeutic and feminist approaches by Hunter, Rosemary et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Hunter, Rosemary and Roach Anleu, Sharyn and Mack, Kathy  (2016) Judging in Lower Courts:
Conventional, procedural, therapeutic and feminist approaches.   International Journal of Law
in Context, 12  (3).   pp. 337-360.  ISSN 1744-5523.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552316000240





This article has been accepted for publication by the International Journal of Law in Context: 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=IJC  © Cambridge University Press.  
 
 
Judging in lower courts:  
Conventional, procedural, therapeutic and feminist approaches 
 
 
Rosemary Hunter Sharyn Roach Anleu Kathy Mack 
School of Law School of Social & Policy 
Studies 
School of Law 
Queen Mary, 
University of London 
Flinders University Flinders University 
Mile End Road, London E1 
4NS, United Kingdom 
GPO Box 2100, Adelaide 
5001, South Australia, 
Australia 
GPO Box 2100, Adelaide 




Professor Kathy Mack 
Email:  judicial.research@flinders.edu.au 
Phone:  +61 8201 5537 
Mail:   Flinders University, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide SA 5001 Australia 
 
Acknowledgement 
Funding for this research includes: a 2001 University-Industry Research Collaborative Grant with 
Flinders University and the Association of Australian Magistrates (AAM) and financial support from 
the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA); an Australian Research Council (ARC) 
Linkage Project Grant (LP0210306) with AAM and all magistrates courts; an ARC Linkage Project 
Grant (LP 0669168) with the magistrates courts of Victoria, South Australia and the Northern 
Territory as well as the AIJA; four ARC Discovery Project Grants (DP0665198, DP1096888, 
DP120102375, DP150103663); and an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Small 
Grant (ES/G008906/1). We are grateful to several research and administrative assistants over the 
course of the research, and to Colleen delaine, Jordan Tutton and Rae Wood for assistance on this 





Recent theorising about feminist judging has concentrated on appellate courts and their judgments. 
This article develops a conceptualisation of feminist judging in lower, first instance courts, which 
are dominated by high case volume and limited time for each matter, with decisions given orally 
and ex tempore rather than in elaborated written judgments. Through careful accounts of the 
philosophy, goals and practices of conventional as well as newer, more engaged approaches to 
judging, the article compares and contrasts feminist judging with other approaches to judging in the 
ORZHUFRXUWV7KLVHQWDLOVFRQVLGHULQJHOHPHQWVVXFKDVWKHMXGLFLDORIILFHU¶VRULHQWDWLRQWR
substantive law and practice in court, concepts of fairness, ethical commitments, the view of the 
defendant, and judicial qualities and capacities. 
 
Introduction  
Theorising around the practice of feminist judging has burgeoned in recent years, most notably in 
feminist judgment projects.1 Much of this work has focused on appellate courts, and on written 
judgments (the outputs of judging) and their contents. At the other end of the court hierarchy, by 
contrast, judicial officers in lower courts handle a high volume of mostly criminal cases with very 
little time for each matter.2 Decisions often address routine procedural matters such as 
adjournments or granting or denying bail which are rarely contested (see Roach Anleu and Mack, 
2009). Even when giving judgment or imposing sentence, formal, elaborated, written judgments are 
rare; decisions are usually given orally, ex tempore and with only a brief explanation (Bolton, 2012; 
Hunter, 2008b; Mack and Roach Anleu, 2007, 2010). 
This gives rise to the question: what might constitute feminist judging in the lower courts? In order 
to answer this, it is necessary to analyse the process of judging ² the way judicial officers manage 
the courtroom and interact with litigants, witnesses, lawyers and prosecutors, as well as (or instead 
of) the content of decisions (Hunter, 2008a; Mack and Roach Anleu, 2012). In contrasting feminist 
judging with conventional judging,3 it is also necessary to consider other approaches to judging 
                                                          
1 Feminist judgment projects have produced alternative judgments for significant legal cases in Australia, 
England and Wales, and Canada: Douglas et al., 2014a; Hunter et al., 2010; Women's Court of Canada; 
Majury, 2006. Similar projects are underway for judgments in international law, Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
the United States Supreme Court, and Aotearoa/New Zealand: IntLawGrrls, 2014; Northern/Irish Feminist 
Judgments Project, 2015; US Feminist Judgments Project, 2015; New Zealand Law Society, 2015; see also 
Brems, 2013. 
For a discussion of feminist judging generally, see Baines, 2013; Hunter, 2008a; Hunter, 2013. For a 
discussion of feminist judgment projects, see Hunter, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2015a; Rackley, 2012.  
2 Lower courts also handle civil matters such as small claims, judgment debt and housing possession cases. 
See, to give only a few examples, Bezdek, 1992; Bolton, 2012; Carlen, 1976; Cowan and Hitchings, 2007; 
Mack and Roach Anleu, 2007; O'Barr and Conley, 1985. 
3 :HXVHWKHWHUPµFRQYHQWLRQDO¶MXGJLQJWRUHIHUWRWKHWUDGLWLRQDOFRQFHSWLRQZLWKLQDQDGYHUVDULDOV\VWHPRI
the judge as a passive, impartial adjudicator, with all that that entails (see section 3 below). 
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which a judicial officer may take. When examining judicial practices, as opposed to the content of 
ZULWWHQGHFLVLRQVKRZGLIIHUHQWLVIHPLQLVWMXGJLQJIURPRWKHUQHZHUIRUPVRIµHQJDJHG¶MXGJLQJ 
(Mack and Roach Anleu, 2011)? 
This article develops a conception of feminist judging in the lower court context, distinguishing it 
from a conventional approach to judging and from two major forms of more engaged judging, 
procedural justice4 and therapeutic jurisprudence. Our focus is on lower courts in common law 
adversarial systems, and hence we draw primarily on literature from the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Distinguishing feminist judging from the other forms of judging requires careful accounts of all four 
approaches. Judging is a practice which consists of an accumulation of individual and institutional 
behaviours, norms, attitudes, approaches and actions, enacted or performed by a judicial officer in 
a specific context (in this analysis, a lower court). Practices are integrally connected with an 
approach or a guiding philosophy about the nature of judging or the judicial role, even if that 
guiding philosophy is implicit and not articulated by the practitioner. For this reason, approach can 
sometimes be discerned from practice.  
The accounts that follow first articulate the underlying philosophy or goals of each approach, and 
second identify practices that are associated with each philosophy or set of goals. This structure is 
adopted for the purposes of analysis, to enable clearer accounts of the similarities and differences 
of the four approaches. It is not intended to imply a necessary linear or causal relationship between 
philosophy and practices, nor to reify a categorical distinction between them which may in reality be 
somewhat blurred. The accounts of both philosophies and practices are based largely on academic 
commentaries, but sources also include judicial reflections, empirical studies and law reform and 
policy documents. 7KHVHDFFRXQWVFRQVLGHUHOHPHQWVVXFKDVWKHMXGLFLDORIILFHU¶VRULHQWDWLRQWR
law and procedure, concepts of fairness, the view of the defendant, ethical orientation, and judicial 
qualities and capacities. They concentrate on judicial work in criminal matters and on its 
performance in lower courts, which impose particular constraints on and opportunities for different 
approaches to judging. Once the philosophies and practices associated with each approach are 
identified, they can be compared and contrasted to discern key points of convergence and 
divergence. Disentangling the key characteristics of different approaches is essential for gaining a 
clear understanding of what scholars and practitioners mean when they refer to particular 
approaches to judging.  
However, identifying differences among judicial philosophies and practices is complex. Newer 
forms of judging, such as therapeutic jurisprudence, which demand a more engaged judicial officer 
may share features with feminist approaches, for example, in their critique of abstract, rule-bound 
                                                          
4 Here we mean procedural justice in the social psychological sense, as elaborated by Lind, Tyler and others, 
not the formal procedural fairness requirements as expressed in administrative law (Lind and Tyler, 1988; 
Rottman and Tyler, 2014; Tyler, 1990; Tyler, 2003). 
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GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ7KHVHIRUPVRIMXGJLQJDOODUJXHIRUDVKLIWIURPMXGJLQJWKDWLVHVVHQWLDOO\µSHRSOH-
SURFHVVLQJ¶(Lipsky, 2010, p. 10; see also Borowski, 2013), treating people as abstractions or 
FDWHJRULHVHJµGHIHQGDQW¶(Borowski, 2013, p. 283), to judicial engagement with individual people 
in particular situations.5 As Margaret Davies points out, characteristics associated with feminist 
judging such as a relational approach or empathy are not exclusive to feminist judging (Davies, 
2012). Because of this potential for overlap, distinctions will need to be drawn explicitly and 
concretely. 
 
2. The context for judicial performance: Judging in lower courts 
Judicial performance is undertaken in a context made up of many different elements including local 
practices and case variation, organisational requirements and wider social or political structures 
(Annison, 2014; Gibson, 1980). Courts and judging are bounded and diverse at all levels, so it is 
necessary to articulate the institutional context of courts generally and lower courts specifically, to 
identify ways that different approaches to judging can be manifest even within a bounded location. 
In all courts, the nature of judging generally will limit the capacity of judges to judge differently. In 
adversarial systems, judicial legitimacy is linked to a particular judicial role constrained by law, by 
fact, and by commitments to judicial values of impartiality, integrity and the rule of law (Epstein et 
al., 2013; Hunter, 2008a; Hunter, 2015b). 
However, judicial officers might adopt a variety of styles of performing their work and these styles 
of judging can be context dependent, or relational, rather than simply a function of personal 
attributes or judicial philosophy (Cowan and Hitchings, 2007; Cowan et al., 2006; Hunter et al., 
2008; Lens, 2012; Smith and Blumberg, 1967). The work of judicial officers relies on the activities 
and inputs of others; it is not just a product of their own individual behaviour (Eisenstein et al., 
1988; Mather, 1979; Tata, 2007). In analysing judicial practices, therefore, it is important to be 
mindful of the conduct of others to which the judicial officer may be responding as well as the 
recipient or audiences for the behaviour. Such an approach avoids viewing judicial performance as 
abstracted from the multiple contexts of judicial work (Roach Anleu and Mack, 2014). 
A key aspect of context for the analysis of judging in lower courts is the opportunity and/or demand 
for judicial interaction. Unrepresented litigants present particular challenges in all courts, but 
especially so in summary proceedings (Moorhead, 2007). For example, 57 per cent of Australian 
                                                          
5 We acknowledge that there have always been judges who have spoken directly to the individuals appearing 
EHIRUHWKHPRIWHQZLWKYHU\SHUVRQDOLVHGFRPPHQWV+RZHYHUWKHVHIRUPVRIMXGLFLDOµHQJDJHPHQW¶ often 
entailed authoritarian or moralising qualities: VHHHJWKHµVLWXDWLRQDOVDQFWLRQV¶GHVFULEHGE\0LOHVNL
p. 521-531) or degradation ceremonies discussed by Carlen (1976) and Garfinkel (1956). Our concern in this 
article is with newer forms of engaged judging whose goals/purposes are more inclusive or transformative. 
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magistrates6 indicate that their time is always or often taken up explaining things to unrepresented 
litigants compared with less than 10 per cent of judges in the higher courts (Mack and Roach 
Anleu, 2011). Unrepresented defendants may require or enable more direct engagement from the 
magistrate, in contrast to a legally represented defendant. This face-to-face interaction may create 
greater demand and/or opportunity for engagement (Goffman, 1955). Even where defendants 
appear with legal representation, the nature of many of the proceedings in lower courts, especially 
sentencing, entails direct communication between the magistrate and the defendant (Mack and 
Roach Anleu, 2011). 
Other features of the lower court environment include the pressure of time and the volume of cases 
coupled with the need to meet court efficiency performance measures, limited information or ability 
to elicit information (whether from the parties or other sources), and limited responses in terms of 
decisions, including sentencing (Mack and Roach Anleu, 2011; Roach Anleu and Mack, 2013b; 
Hunter, 2005; Mileski, 1971). Judicial officers are aware of the practical contingencies of their work 
context and need to manage them in various ways (Fielding, 2011; Mack and Roach Anleu, 2007). 
The effect is that there may be limited opportunities for varied approaches to judging to take place 
in lower courts, when routinisation appears so inevitable and necessary (Hunter, 2005; Mack and 
Roach Anleu, 2010; Mileski, 1971). 
In spite of these distinct lower court challenges, this is a site where feminist and other engaged 
forms of judging could have broad scope and relevance. These courts deal directly with a large 
number of individuals; inequalities and disadvantages are starkly visible. Legal representation is 
limited, and where it exists may be poorly prepared or inexperienced (Bolton, 2012; Mack et al., 
2012)$VWKHµSHRSOHV¶FRXUW¶RUWKHPHWDSKRULFDOIDFHRIWKHMXVWLFHsystem, they provide more 
opportunity for judicial officers to interact directly with individuals (Roach Anleu and Mack, 2007). 
Lower courts are also the courts where there are more women judicial officers (Australasian 
Institute of Judicial Administration, 2015; Courts and Tribunal Judiciary (UK), 2014), though being a 
woman does not necessarily entail taking a feminist approach (see, for example, Hunter, 2008a). 
Further, lower courts are the location where the most common form of gendered crime ² domestic 
violence ² appears regularly, whether in the form of restraining order applications or criminal 
charges (Hunter, 2008b). And they are the courts which deal most often with the kind of repeat, 
low-level offending, sanctioning and re-offending which has given rise to calls for new interventions 
WRKDOWWKHµUHYROYLQJGRRU¶RIFULPLQDOMXVWLFH(King et al., 2014). 
                                                          
6 Each Australian state and territory has a magistrates court (called the Local Court in New South Wales) and 
a supreme court. The five most populous states have an intermediate trial court (named the district or county 
court), which hears criminal jury trials and civil matters without juries. Magistrates courts in the Australian 
states and territories are first-instance courts of general jurisdiction. Unlike the lay magistrates of England 
and Wales, Australian magistrates are paid judicial officers, nearly always full time, with legal qualifications, 
and appointed until a fixed retirement age: Roach Anleu and Mack, 2008. They sit alone without juries, in 
regional and remote areas as well as in capital cities; those who appear in these courts are often 
unrepresented. Over 90 per cent of all civil and criminal cases are initiated and finalised in the lower courts: 
Mack and Roach Anleu, 2007; Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2015. For more detail 
regarding Australian courts and the judiciary see Crawford and Opeskin, 2004; Lee and Campbell, 2013. 
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3. Conventional judging 
Philosophy 
Judicial legitimacy in an adversarial legal system is based on a particular concept of neutrality of 
judicial authority (Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2002; Australian Law Reform 
Commission, 2000; King et al., 2014). The judge is expected to display a particular form of 
detached impartiality, participating actively only when a decision, ruling or order is required by the 
parties (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2000; Berman, 2000; Farole, 2009; King et al., 2014; 
Shaman, 1996). This conventional judge is disembodied, objective, unemotional and impersonal 
(Maroney, 2011a, 2011b; Maroney and Gross, 2014; Shaman, 1996). Law, fact and reason are the 
legitimate sources for judicial decisions, not a personal choice of the judicial officer (Malleson, 
1999; Moorhead, 2007; Tamanaha, 2010). This view was reflected by Justice Sonia Sotomayor at 
KHU866HQDWHFRQILUPDWLRQKHDULQJVZKHUHVKHDVVHUWHGµ>L@W¶VQRWWKHKHDUWWKDWFRPSHOV
FRQFOXVLRQVLQFDVHVLW¶VWKHODZ¶(United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 2009; see 
also Lithwick, 2009). Under this conception of judicial authority, the judge embodies impartial legal 
authority. When applying law, personal views, biases, values and emotions should be set aside, 
and so the identity or social characteristics of judges should not affect the decisions made (Bybee, 
2010; Moran, 2009, 2010). 
The focus of this approach is on formal procedures defined by law, as the means to enforce 
existing substantive law. Such conventional judging is thought to reflect the importance of formal 
due process (Chriss, 2002) WRSURWHFWOHJDOULJKWVDQGWROLPLWµVFRSHIRUDFFXVDWLRQVRIELDVDQG
IDYRXULWLVP¶(Bean, 2002, pp. 249-250). Depersonalisation and abstraction are central to 
conventional understandings of the adversarial judicial role (Bandes, 2009; Maroney, 2011b; 
Maroney, 2011a). Litigants and facts are abstracted and categorisHGWRHQVXUHWKDWµOLNHFDVHVDUH
WUHDWHGDOLNH¶(YHQLQWKHFRQWH[WRIVHQWHQFLQJZKHQDGHIHQGDQW¶VSHUVRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQG 
individual circumstances must be taken into account, this is done in a structured, often routinised 
and categorical way which is designed to achieve consistency between similar cases (Heimer, 
2001; Emerson, 1983). Abstraction enables cases to be determined according to law, without 
LOOHJLWLPDWHUHJDUGWRDGHIHQGDQW¶VSHUVRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGOLPLWVWKHLPSDFWRILQGLYLGXDO
judicial attitudes or preferences. 
An important consequence of this legalistic approach is to insulate the judicial officer from personal 
responsibility to address the wider social needs of those who appear in court (Farole et al., 2005; 
King et al., 2014; McCoy, 1997). As former Chief Justice John Doyle of the South Australian 




(Doyle, 2001, emphasis omitted; see also Roach Anleu and Mack, 2007). 
 
Practice 
The legitimacy of judicial decisions is formally based in law, and judicial officers exercise their 
authority every day in court settings bounded by legally defined rules, procedures and roles 
(Gleeson, 2010; Heydon, 2012; Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2002). Using legal 
language, following prescribed procedures, and observing delineated professional roles reinforce 
formal judicial authority and legitimacy as does courthouse and courtroom design (Mulcahy, 2007; 
Mulcahy, 2011; Resnik and Curtis, 2011; Tait, 2002; Tamanaha, 2010). 
Legal authority must be supported by appropriate performance on the part of the judicial officer ² 
WKHµRXWZDUGFRXQWHQDQFH¶LQ+RFKVFKLOG¶VWHUPV(Hochschild, 1983, p. 7). The conventional 
judging philosophy is thought to require judges to display a demeanour that communicates 
impartiality through impersonality, emotional detachment and disinterestedness (Baker, 1994; 
Bandes, 2009; Bean, 2002; Bybee, 2010; Maroney, 2011b; Maroney, 2011a; Moorhead and 
Cowan, 2007; Popovic, 2002; Shaman, 1996; Nussbaum, 1996). An impersonal demeanour and a 
lack of emotional expression are thought to demonstrate that judicial decisions are impartial, 
compelled by law, fact and reason and not based on personal choice or emotion (Mack and Roach 
Anleu, 2010, 2011; Moorhead and Cowan, 2007; Roach Anleu and Mack, 2005, 2013a). The 
capacity to produce such a performance may be among the qualities identified by judicial 
appointments processes, and feature in professional training programs (see, for example, Judicial 
Appointments Board for Scotland; Judicial Appointment Commission (UK); see also Australasian 
Institute of Judicial Administration, 2002; American Bar Association, 2007; Gleeson, 1998; 
Thomas, 1997). 
The conventional understanding of neutrality in an adversarial system, for example, would 
ordinarily prevent a judicial officer from engaging directly with a legally represented participant 
present in court. If the participant is legally represented, the judicial officer formally interacts with 
the lawyer, not the party. While legal representation is undoubtedly beneficial to participants, it can 
have the effect of rendering them more removed from and less visible in the proceedings, 
especially if the judicial officer does not engage with them in any way (Douglas and Laster, 1992; 
Freiberg, 2007; King et al., 2014; Popovic, 2002). 
Sentencing is a key location where a philosophy of judging may manifest itself in everyday practice. 
Sentencing in Australia, for example, is often an area of wide judicial choice (Mackenzie et al., 
2010), and most sentencing decisions in lower courts are given ex tempore (Bolton, 2012; Roach 
Anleu and Mack, 2013b). An impersonal judicial manner may be especially appropriate during 
 8 
sentencing, as a way to reinforce the wrongfulness of the criminal conduct (Hunter, 2005; Ptacek, 
1999; Were v Police [2003] SASC 116). 
When a judicial officer imposes sentence, giving reasons is often legally required (Australian Law 
Reform Commission, 2006; Mackenzie, 2005). Communicating reasons allows the magistrate to 
highlight the law and facts that underpin the sentence, distancing her- or himself from personal 
responsibility for the substance and effect of the decision (Roach Anleu and Mack, 2013b; Tata, 
2007). Stating the basis for the decision, including specific legal requirements, reinforces the 
conventional adversarial norm of the judge as a neutral decision-maker who must apply the law, 
and demonstrates that the sentence results from a dispassionate evaluation rather than from bias 
or emotional reaction (Roach Anleu and Mack, 2005; Thomas, 1963). 
These elements of practice can reflect a conventional judging philosophy and reinforce the formal 
legitimacy of the exercise of judicial authority in conventional terms. 
  
4. Procedural justice judging 
Philosophy 
A different philosophy of the judicial role is derived from research which emphasises the 
importance of relational or interactive qualities to the legitimate exercise of authority, including 
judicial authority (Fiss, 1983; Tyler, 1984, 1988). While conventional judging implicitly values 
judicial behaviours such as courtesy, a procedural justice approach to judging recognises the 
extent to which judicial authority depends RQWKHµTXDOLW\RIWKHLQWHUSHUVRQDOWUHDWPHQWWKDWSHRSOH
H[SHULHQFH¶(Tyler, 2003, p. 350). Those who experience or observe judicial behaviours which 
effectively communicate respect for the humanity and individuality of people appearing in court 
may attribute legitimacy-enhancing attitudes or feelings to the judicial officer. Showing human 
respect for another human person may indicate, or be perceived as indicating, that the judicial 
officer cares about the welfare of the person appearing in court, or is committed to values of justice 




WUHDWLQJWKRVHZLWKUHVSHFWHYHQZKLOHUDLVLQJTXHVWLRQVDERXWSDUWLFXODUFRQGXFW« [A] key 
issue to people when dealing with legal authorities is the respect and dignity with which they 
are treated (Tyler, 2003, pp. 350-351; see also Tyler, 2000). 
Empirical research confirms the value of procedural justice as an approach to judging. This 
procedural justice effect has been observed in defendants in summary proceedings, including 
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when being sentenced. A judicial officer who treats the defendant with respect when imposing a 
sentence will elicit greater acceptance of the decision than a sentence delivered in way that does 
not display elements of procedural fairness (Tyler, 1984; Casper et al., 1988). 
The finding that the way a judicial officer delivers a decision, including imposing sentence, can 
have as much or even more impact on perceptions of fairness and legitimacy than the actual 
decision or sentence itself raises the question of the relationship between the display of procedural 
justice behaviours and the substance of the decision. The procedural justice literature tends not to 
question VXEVWDQWLYHGHFLVLRQVRUDVVXPHVWKDWWKH\DUHWKHPVHOYHVµFRUUHFW¶DQGµOHJLWLPDWH¶
(MacCoun, 2005). The procedural justice focus is on the conduct of the person in authority, and the 
LPSDFWRIWKDWFRQGXFWRQSHUFHSWLRQVRIOHJLWLPDF\$µMXGJH>ZKR@Ls seen as having taken enough 
WLPHWRFRQVLGHUWKHFDVHFDUHIXOO\DQGDVXQELDVHG¶(Tyler, 1984, p. 67) will enhance the authority 
DQGOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQV 
In a sense, these findings confirm the importance of a perception that the judge is doing his or her 
job properly in light of conventional norms. Arguably, procedural justice is partly about behaviour 
that better operationalises conventional judging norms and values than the conventional detached 
performance. However, a humanist element distinguishes the procedural justice approach from the 
conventional approachZLWKLWVH[SOLFLWFRQFHUQZLWKWKHOLWLJDQW¶VGLJQLW\DQGWKHLUH[SHULHQFHRIWKH
proceedings. It is the difference between the litigant or defendant as a category and the 
litigant/defendant as an individual deserving to be listened to, to receive explanations, and to have 
their voice validated by the judge. 
Practices 
Four key elements of procedural justice as a practice are: 
1. Voice, allowing opportunities for parties to participate or express views 
2. Neutrality, including transparency, principled decisions, lack of bias 
3. Respect shown by treating people with dignity 
4. Trustworthiness, generated by listening, explaining, justifying decisions (Tyler, 2007-2008, 
pp. 30-33; Burke and Leben, 2007-2008, p. 6) 
Burke and Leben provide more concrete advice about judicial practices to implement a procedural 
justice approach. This entails qualities and behaviours such as: 
x Using understandable language, even if the participant has a lawyer 
x Listening better 
x Showing patience and thanking those in court for their patience 
x Explaining ground rules early, such as the order in which cases are called 
x Making the courtroom work for all participants, including unrepresented parties 
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x Developing court procedures to support communication that will enhance perceived 
fairness (Burke and Leben, 2007-2008, pp. 18-19) 
The considerable, relatively informal interaction which may occur between the judicial officer and 
the parties in lower courts, especially with unrepresented parties, may allow judicial officers to 
communicate with a participant in ways that will enhance perceived procedural fairness (Tyler, 
1984, 1990, 1988). Conduct associated with procedural fairness might include a judicial officer 
communicating effectively to a defendant, such as by explaining processes and decisions carefully 
(Mack and Roach Anleu, 2011; Roach Anleu and Mack, 2013b). Meeting ordinary conversational 
expectations, such as looking at and speaking directly to a defendant, conveys respect. This kind 
of direct engagement and the respect it implies are key elements of the values of procedural 
justice, going beyond conventional judicial norms and behaviours of formal courtesy. 
7KHFRQWHQWRIWKHMXGLFLDORIILFHU¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHGefendant may also evince procedural 
justice. When a defendant is to be sentenced, the judicial officer will be given information about the 
defendant, including personal and family background, any work history or previous offending. The 
judicial officer is expected to listen carefully so that this material is part of the process of reaching a 
decision on sentence. A judicial officer who clearly communicates how the individual circumstances 
of the defendant have been considered shows that the defendant is regarded as a person, not as 
an abstraction or category: e.g. defendant or shoplifter.  
While the practical context of a lower court can enhance opportunities for procedural justice 
practices, it can also limit them. In particular, there are severe limits on the time available for a 
judicial officer to engage with each participant and to provide the more individualised attention 
necessary to achieve procedural justice (Mack and Roach Anleu, 2007). This time pressure may 
sometimes lead to rushed or inconsiderate treatment of participants and so undermine procedural 
justice goals (Mack and Roach Anleu, 2010; Burke and Leben, 2007-2008). 
Active judicial conduct to achieve procedural justice goals also depends on the practical 
cooperation of others, in and out of court. Because such engagement may appear to conflict with 
the formally passive judicial role of conventional norms, there may be resistance to greater judicial 
engagement (Burke and Leben, 2007-2008). This may require the judicial officer to ensure visible 
compliance with important adversarial norms, while implementing procedural justice values, to 
maximise the support for judicial authority. 
 
5. Therapeutic judging 
Philosophy 
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Therapeutic jurisprudence conceptualises legal processes in relation to the physical, emotional and 
psychological wellbeing of the participants (King and Ford, 2006; Wexler and Winick, 2003, p. 54; 
McMahon and Wexler, 2002; Wexler, 2000). In the past, law, particularly in the form of criminal 
punishment, has had harmful consequences for defendants, especially those experiencing mental 
illness, and/or other psycho-social problems (King et al., 2014). Judicial and academic proponents 
of therapeutic jurisprudence, put forward a new way of thinking about law and legal authority as a 
vehicle to maximise the therapeutic and minimise the non-therapeutic effects of law, bring about 
SRVLWLYHFKDQJHHQKDQFHZHOOEHLQJRUDWOHDVWµWRGRQRKDUP¶(Winick, 2002-2003, p. 1063; King, 
2008). The general philosophy of therapeutic jurisprudence is that certain law-breaking behaviour 
is symptomatic of deeper social, economic and personal problems. Because conventional legal 
process does not effectively address these problems, or disclaims responsibility for addressing 
them, offending behaviour will often continue. Therapeutic jurisprudence, by contrast, recognises 
that people in court have unaddressed problems and seeks to encourage them to acknowledge 
and address these problems (Winick, 2002-2003, pp. 1061, 1067). Rather than regarding the 
defendant as a rational actor responding to the level and probability of sanctions for their 
EHKDYLRXUWKHUROHRIDWKHUDSHXWLFMXGJHLVµWRPRWLYDWHRIIHQGHUVWRHQJDJHLQWUHDWPHQWDQGWR
develop plans to eliminate or reduce unhealthy or anti-VRFLDOEHKDYLRXUV«DQd replace them with 
KHDOWK\EHKDYLRXUV¶:LHQHUet al., 2010, p. 419-422). In doing so, persuasion rather than coercion 
is key (Winick, 2002-2003, p. 1078). µ7KHUDSHXWLFMXULVSUXGHQFHYDOXHVVHOI-determination as it 
activates motivation and other inner resources needed for successful action, and recognises that 
FRHUFLRQDQGSDWHUQDOLVPKDYHWKHUHYHUVHHIIHFWDQGSURPRWHUHVLVWDQFHWRFKDQJH¶(King, 2008, 
p. 1115).  
A judicial officer who implements a therapeutic jurisprudence approach to judging will provide a 
more individualised intervention, which aims to enable a defendant to overcome drug addiction or 
other problems which have led to criminal offending. These interventions, which may require 
participation in drug treatment, education or training programs, coupled with stringent conditions 
such as drug testing, overseen regularly by a judicial officer, are expected to promote self-esteem 
and to help ameliorate some of the consequences of economic disadvantage and social 
marginalisation (Nolan, 1998; Burns and Peyrot, 2003; see also Berman and Feinblatt, 2001; 
Freiberg, 2001; Goldberg, 2005; Phelan, 2003, 2004). 
Therapeutic jurisprudence thus espouses a commitment to therapeutic agency on the part of the 
judicial officer that emphasises engagement, understanding, assistance, motivation, guidance, 
encouragement, affirmation and treatment (Winick, 2002-2003, pp. 1065-1068). Goldberg 
UHLWHUDWHVWKLVµ'LUHFWLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQDMXGJHDQGFRXUWSDUWLFLSants is a foundation of problem-
solving judging, aQGDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRUHIIHFWLYHEHKDYLRXUPRGLILFDWLRQDQGIRUFKDQJH¶(Goldberg, 
2005, p. 9). This contrasts with the conventional judicial emphases on detachment and neutrality 
(Emerson, 1969). The judicial officer committed to a therapeutic jurisprudence approach cares 
what will happen to the defendant, but that care is bounded by strong limits: the participant must 
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comply with treatment requirements and be committed to change or provide an acceptable 
DFFRXQW,IWKHVHHOHPHQWVGRQRWH[LVWMXGLFLDOµFDUH¶PD\UHYHUWWRFRQYHQWLRQDOMXGLFLDODXWKRULW\WR
impose sanctions.  
The philosophy of therapeutic judging necessarily implies power and inequality in a relationship 
(see Rieff, 1966; Winick, 2002-2003, p. 1060; Wright, 2010). Perhaps implicitly, therapeutic 
jurisprudence adopts a model of the individual participant as sick and requiring treatment. It draws 
on sources of authority and social control in addition to law ² medicine and psychology ² to provide 
diagnosis, treatment and cure. The care and treatment provided within the therapeutic process thus 
operates as a form of regulation, an exercise of biopower in Foucauldian terms (Rabinow and 
Rose, 2006; Rose, 1993; Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose et al., 2006). The relationship and 
interaction between the judge and the participant are asymmetrical, not egalitarian. The judicial 
RIILFHU¶VUROHLVWRKHOSVHHNLQIRUPDWLRQRQVXSSRUWDQGHPSDWKLse with the participant, not vice 
versa. It is the problems of the participant that require correction, and the judicial officer retains 
legal authority to offer solutions and to punish non-compliance (Moore, 2007; Moore et al., 2011). 
 
Practices  
The active problem-solving agenda which is central to the therapeutic jurisprudence philosophy 
operates on two levels in practice: the interaction between the judicial officer and the court 
participant, and the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach to problem solving, involving a range 
of professional input, most often institutionalised in problem-solving courts.  
Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses on the relationship between the judicial officer and court 
participant, and the interaction between the two as having therapeutic potential. In this interaction, 
the input of the judicial officer is key (King, 2003, 2006; McIvor, 2009). Therapeutic jurisprudence 
values warmth, openness, emotional attachment, empathy, respect, active listening, a positive 
focus, non-coercion, non-paternalism, clarity, and plain language (Winick, 2002-2003, p. 1068; 
Winick and Wexler, 2003; Goldberg, 2005). 
The practical implementation of therapeutic jurisprudence occurs most typically in problem-solving 
FRXUWV$OWKRXJKµLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRGLVWLQJXLVKSUREOHP-solving courts (a practical legal innovation) 
from therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice (theories of justice generated within the 
DFDGHPLFZRUOG¶(Nolan, 2003, p. 1546; see also Braithwaite, 1989; Hora et al., 1999) these courts 
are the primary site where the philosophy of therapeutic jurisprudence is practised.  
The therapeutic solution to personal problems as practised in problem-solving courts requires an 
interdisciplinary approach. Judicial authority, in tandem with other professional disciplines 
(especially helping professions, social work, counselling, psychology) develops a program which 
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the court participant must follow in order to change their lives and desist from offending.7 µ>(@[SHUW
NQRZOHGJHVDUHIUHHGIURPH[SHUWDFWRUV¶ (Moore, 2007, p. 44). Judges adopt the language of 
therapy and draw on information and knowledge from psychology and wellbeing, while counsellors 
and psychologists frame information and concerns in legal language and processes.  
2IWHQLQSUREOHPVROYLQJFRXUWVWKHMXGLFLDOGHFLVLRQPD\QRWEHDERXWSXQLVKLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V




Proponents argue that therapeutic jurisprudence need not be limited to problem-solving courts, and 
that all judicial officers can implement a therapeutic jurisprudence approach (Bartels, 2009; 
Goldberg, 2005)µ(YHU\MXGLFLDORIILFHULVDEOHWRPLQLPLVHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVDQGWo promote positive 
effects on participant well-being through the nature of the interaction that takes place between the 
EHQFKDQGWKHSDUW\LQYROYHG¶ (King, 2003, p. 172; see also Wexler and Winick, 1991). A judicial 
officer who wishes to take a therapeutic jurisprudence approach in a general criminal court will 
need to understand social or psychological factors relating to criminal behaviour, which may 
involve working with social services professionals. In court, a judge implementing therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles will engage more actively and less formally with the defendant and will 
undertake steps to facilitate access to necessary services. 
Whether in general criminal courts or in problem solving courts, a key element in therapeutic 
jurisprudence is a more active judicial officer (King, 2003; King and Auty, 2005; King and Wager, 
2005; McMahon and Wexler, 2002; Wexler, 2000). As Popovic has pointed RXWµWKHWKHUDSHXWLF
jurisprudence approach requires judicial officers who are prepared to modify their judicial style and 
WRHPEDUNRQDQHZIRUPRI³FRXUW-FUDIW´¶ (Popovic, 2002, p. 128). A judicial officer who undertakes 
a therapeutic jurisprudence approach will develop enhanced interpersonal skills, be more aware of 
the personal circumstances of defendants when they appear in court, be more interested in their 
welfare, and will be more positive when interacting with them. The judge will engage with the 
defendant, listening actively and communicating directly, often informally and more personally 
(Popovic, 2002; Winick, 2002-2003; King, 2003, 2006; Satel, 1998). ,QGLVFXVVLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
SUREOHPVWKHMXGJHVKRXOGµFRPPXQLFDWHDVHQVHRIFDULQJV\Ppathy, genuineness and 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶:LQLFN-2003, p. 1069). 
While therapeutic jurisprudence practices of judicial interaction overlap with those espoused for 
procedural justice, therapeutic jurisprudence is not simply about making people feel that justice has 
                                                          
7 Although the discussion here focuses on problem-solving courts in the criminal law context, they may also 
operate in areas of civil law, such as the Family Drug and Alcohol Courts (FDAC) currently being rolled out in 
England and Wales, which seek to address the addiction problems and related parenting deficits of parents 
at risk of having children taken into care. See Harwin et al., 2014. 
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been done, or that they have been listened to, and will therefore be more accepting of legal 
outcomes. Rather, procedural justice is seen as instrumental to the achievement of therapeutic 
goals. If defendants are treated with dignity and respect and given a sense of voice and validation, 
it is thought they will comply more willingly with treatment programs and be more likely to choose 
healthy behaviours (Winick 2002-2003, pp. 1088-1089; Wiener et al., 2010, pp. 422-423). The 
focus remains on encouraging individuals to address the root causes of offending ² drug addiction, 
mental illness, violence and other psycho-social problems ² and thereby enabling them to change 
their behaviour, in response to the positive, direct relationship with the judicial officer.  
 
6. Feminist judging 
Philosophy 
It is more difficult to articulate a philosophy of feminist judging than it is to do so for procedurally 
just judging and therapeutic jurisprudence. First, unlike procedural justice and therapeutic 
jurisprudence, feminism is not primarily a theory of judging or a theory which has been developed 
in relation to judging. Feminism is a wider social theory and political practice which seeks to explain 
the causes of and to UHPHG\ZRPHQ¶VGLVDGYDQWDJHVLQHqualities, and subordination. Second, 
feminism is not unitary. There are multiple feminisms providing different answers to these 
questions. Thus, there is also the possibility of varying approaches among feminist judges (see 
Hunter et al., 2010). 
Taking all this together, we would identify the basic philosophy of feminist judging as being to 
achieve gender justice, to the extent possible within the constraints of the judicial role. Many 
feminist judges are also concerned to achieve justice for other traditionally excluded groups 
(Hunter, 2008a).8 This philosophy is based on the understanding that law does not currently 
provide equal justice for all, that it is not in fact neutral and objective, but demonstrates a persistent 
bias towards the experiences, perspectives and interests of privileged white men. The role of a 
feminist judge is therefore to achieve justice by being alert to the ways in which apparently neutral 
or objective legal rules and practices may impact differently on women and men (Bartlett, 1990), 
and by acknowledging and incorporating, where relevant, the experiences, perspectives and 
interests of women and other traditionally excluded groups into decision-making (Boyle, 1985; 
Douglas et al., 2014a; Graycar, 1995; Hunter, 2008a, 2010, 2013; L'Heureux-Dubé, 1997). This 
PD\EHEDVHGRQWKHMXGLFLDORIILFHU¶VNQRZOHGJHRIZRPHQ¶VDQGµRWKHU¶OLYHVDQGRIWKHKLVWRULF
and systemic disadvantages experienced by women and other traditionally excluded groups. At the 
same time, the feminist judge will be aware of the limits of her own knowledge (Lawrence, 2004), 
                                                          
8 It is acknowledged that not all feminisms are concerned with other axes of power such as race, class, 
colonialism and sexuality, but these differences are often MXULVGLFWLRQDOZLWKµUDGLFDO¶OHJDOIHPLQLVPKDYLQJ
more purchase in the United States and in some international fora than elsewhere (see Valverde, 2015, 
ch. 4).   
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and will be open to wider evidence and to hearing and trying to comprehend perspectives and 
experiences far removed from her own. Feminist judging may also be based, at least implicitly, on 
feminist theoretical knowledge, such as knowledge about the dynamics of abusive relationships, 
the objectification of women, the gender division of labour, the gendered effects of the 
public/private divide, the difference between formal and substantive equality, the feminisation of 
poverty, rape myths, feminist theories of sexual, reproductive and relational autonomy, 
intersectionality and so forth (Hunter et al., 2010). 
Notably, feminist judging has substantive rather than simply procedural goals. It aims to achieve 
gender justice in the outcomes of cases as well as in the process of judging, and to consider the 
effects of decisions on broader social relationships. At the same time, there are many aspects of 
the process of judging which may be susceptible to a feminist approach. 
 
Practices 
In the process of hearing evidence and analysing facts, it has been argued that feminist judicial 
RIILFHUVVKRXOGHQJDJHLQµIHPLQLVWSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJ¶ (Bartlett, 1990, pp. 849-850), that is, 
reasoning from context, focusiQJRQWKHUHDOLW\RIZRPHQ¶VOLYHGH[SHULHQFHLQHDFKVLWXDWLRQDQG
producing a decision which considers the specific individual(s) before the court rather than relying 
on abstractions, generalisations or stereotypes. Contextualisation, as a feminist method, requires 
considering the specific situation of the parties, as well as the broader social context within which 
legal rules operate (Hunter, 2008a; see also Hunter, 2010; Douglas et al., 2014b). In a criminal 
FDVHDFFRUGLQJWR+HOHQ2¶6XOOLYDQWKHMXGge should take into account the particular 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHDFFXVHGWKHDFFXVHUDQGWKHFDVHDQGVKRXOGµUHDOO\ORRN¶DWWKHSDUWLHV
before her, treating both the accused and the accuser as people with reason, emotion and 
vulnerabilities, and as worthy of equal respect and dignity (O'Sullivan, 2007). Similarly, Patricia 
&DLQKDVRIIHUHGWKHIROORZLQJIHPLQLVWUHFDVWLQJRI-XGJH/HDUQHG+DQG¶VDGYLFHWRMXGJHV 
When you listen as a judge, you must transcend your sense of self, so that you can really 
listen. Listen to the story that is being told. Do not prejudge it. Do not say this is not part of 
my experience. But listen in such a way as to make it part of your experience. Find some 
VPDOOSDUWRI\RXURZQVHOIWKDWLVOLNHWKH2WKHU¶VVWRU\,GHQWLI\ with the Other. Do not 
contrast. Only when you have really listened, and only then, should you judge (Cain, 1988, 
p. 1955). 
Ensuring that the context is properly understood might include specifically ascertaining facts, such 
DVDZRPDQGHIHQGDQW¶VGRPHVWLc situation, whether she is the primary carer of young children, 
and what the impact on the children would be of sending her to jail (Daly, 1989). 
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In making assessments of credibility, a feminist judicial officer would challenge rather than rely 
upon stereotypical or biased assumptions about sexual, racial and other forms of difference in 
behaviour (Hunter, 2008a; cf. Elvin, 2010). Challenging gender bias and stereotypes may include 
UHMHFWLQJµVWRFNVWRULHV¶DQGP\WKVDERXWYLFWLPV¶UHDFWLRQVDQGchallenging prosecutors and 
defence lawyers who attempt to rely on such myths and stereotypes in building their cases, cross-
examining witnesses and making submissions (Hunter, 2008a, 2010, 2013; Douglas et al., 2014b). 
Conversely, a feminist judicial offiFHU¶VEDFNJURXQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZRPHQ¶VOLYHVDQGRIIHPLQLVW
WKHRU\PLJKWPDNHKHUPRUHLQFOLQHGWREHOLHYHDZLWQHVV¶VVWRU\PRUHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRID
GHIHQGDQW¶VEHKDYLRXUPRUHLQFOLQHGWRDVVHVVPDWWHUVDVVHULRXVRUPRUHDEOHWRXQGHUVWDQGD
victim¶VIHDULQWKHFRQWH[WRIGRPHVWLFYLROHQFH (see, for example, Hale, 2001, 2007; Hunter, 
2008a, 2013). 
In lower courts, one of the key practices of a feminist judicial officer will be her management of the 
courtroom, including her own interactions with participants and her management of interactions 
between participants. A feminist judicial officer may (though will not necessarily) subscribe to and 
DWWHPSWWRLPSOHPHQWDIHPLQLVWHWKLFRIFDUHZKLFKLVPDUNHGE\DYLHZRIRQH¶VSRVLWLRQLQUHODWLRQ
to others as connected, relational, caring, nurturing and responsible, as opposed to the abstract, 
distanced, disengaged and legalistic stance of the conventional ethic of justice (see Crock and 
Steer, 2014; Gilligan, 1982; Resnik, 1988; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Sherry, 1986). The therapeutic 
judge, for example, is clearly expected to evince an ethic of care towards the offenders appearing 
before her (King, 2009) and some feminist judicial officers may share this approach.  
A feminist judicial officer might also seek to manage the courtroom so as to provide a process 
which supports, affirms and validates ² rather than minimises ² the experiences of victims of 
violence, expressing support and sympathy, naming harm and impressing on perpetrators the 
unacceptability of violent behaviour (O'Shane, 1994; Ptacek, 1999; Resnik, 1988). More generally, 
a feminist magistrate might seek to manage the courtroom so as to provide a process that 
minimises trauma for victims of crime (Martin, 1989; Hale, 2007; Hunter, 2008a), which might 
include enforcing available protections for vulnerable witnesses (Easteal, 1998; Hale, 2007; 
Hunter, 2015b) or close supervision of cross-examination (Schultz, 2001). As Hale has noted: 
«SURSHUO\SURWHFWLQJWKHSURVHFXWLRQZLWQHVVHVZKLOHDOORZLQJWKHdefence properly to 
deploy its case is a hugely demanding task. It is so much easier to sit back and let defence 
FRXQVHOULS«(QDEOLQJDOOWKHZLWQHVVHVRQHLWKHUVLGHWRJLYHWKHLUEHVWHYLGHQFHLVD
much more radical idea than you might think (Hale, 2007, p. 24). 
In summary, while feminist judicial officers in the lower courts, by contrast with appellate judges, 
may have limited scope to take a critical approach to legislation or legal doctrine, there are a range 
of ways in which they may implement a feminist approach in the process of fact-finding, in their 
interactions with defendants and witnesses, and in their management of the courtroom to provide a 
fair and just experience for all participants. As noted earlier, the lower courts are most likely to deal 
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with women defendants and gendered subject-matter such as domestic violence, and so the 
possibilities for feminist judging may be much greater than in higher courts. 
 
7. Comparing conventional, procedural justice, therapeutic and feminist 
judging 
These four approaches to judging involve differences in judicial philosophy as well as different 
judicial practices, though there is also considerable overlap between them. While all are concerned 
with core values of neutrality, impartiality and fair procedures, the three newer approaches to 
judging grow out of critiques of conventional judging. Common goals of the newer forms of judging, 
ZKLFKFRQWUDVWZLWKFRQYHQWLRQDOMXGJLQJDUHWRµDGGUHVVWKHZKROHSHUVRQQRWVLPSO\D
GHSHUVRQDOLVHGRIIHQGHU¶ (King et al., 2009, p. 83) DQGWRµFRQVLGHUWKHHIIHFWV«>RIWKHOHJDO
SURFHVV@RQSHRSOHLQFRXUW¶ (Goldberg, 2005, p. 3). However these new approaches also differ in 
the nature and extent of their divergence from conventional judging.  
 
Philosophy 
The four approaches posit different goals for the judicial process. In conventional judging, the aim 
is to achieve and project legal legitimacy from the internal perspective of the legal system, through 
the impartial application of legal rules. Procedural justice is also concerned with legal legitimacy, 
but from an external perspective ± that of the litigant. Procedural justice argues that court users are 
more likely to attribute legitimacy to a system which treats them with respect and dignity and makes 
them feel they have been heard. Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses instead on the capacity of law 
to do good rather than harm, to enhance the personal wellbeing of court users, and in particular, to 
address the root causes of offending behaviour and thereby to cure rather than merely punish the 
offender. By contrast, the substantive goal of feminist judging is to achieve gender or wider social 
justice, a goal which has potentially broader impacts than reforming individual offenders. At the 
same time, and unlike the other three approaches, feminist judging may not be applicable in every 
case, but only in those where an issue of gender or wider social justice arises. Moreover, feminist 
judging is constrained by the demands of (internal) legitimacy. A feminist judicial officer cannot 
pursue gender justice in disregard of the law, but may only do so within the limits of the law, such 
as through the legitimate exercise of discretion, assessment of evidence and management of the 
courtroom and the proceedings (Hunter, 2008a, 2010, 2015b). 
The different philosophical underpinnings of the four approaches result in different views of 
substantive law, different ethical orientations, different focuses of attention, and different views of 
criminal defendants. Neither conventional judging nor procedural justice tend to question 
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substantive legal rules: they are simply the rules which must be applied, according to thinner or 
thicker conceptions of procedural justice. The exception to this may be a resistance within 
conventional judging to rules which are perceived to unduly limit judicial discretion (such as 
PDQGDWRU\VHQWHQFLQJSURYLVLRQVWRFRQWUDYHQHµIXQGDPHQWDO¶FRPPRQODZSULQFLSOHVRUWRRIIHQG
MXGLFLDOµFRPPRQVHQVH¶ (Fielding, 2011; Hunter, 2015b). Therapeutic jurisprudence in its full sense 
does not so much question legal rules as work around them. Criminal punishment is suspended 
while the offender undergoes the treatment regime, but if she or he fails to complete the course, the 
punishment regime is reinstated with full force. Feminist judging, on the other hand, may, at higher 
levels of the court hierarchy, involve changing legal rules to achieve more just results for women 
and other outsiders. In the lower courts, however, while there is no scope for changing rules, there 
may be scope for criticising them and working for reform (Roach Anleu and Mack, 2007). At the 
same time, feminist judicial officers may be concerned fully to implement progressive laws 
designed to achieve gender or wider social justice, such as laws on discrimination, domestic 
violence and protections for vulnerable witnesses (Hunter, 2015b). 
In terms of ethical orientations, conventional judging employs the traditional ethic of justice, which 
abstracts the issues and typically resolves conflicts by resort to a hierarchy of rights. Procedural 
justice and therapeutic jurisprudence might be seen, by contrast, to implement an ethic of care, in 
that the judicial officer seeks to establish a relationship with the parties, engages with them directly, 
and takes responsibility for their experience of the process (in the case of procedural justice) or for 
their wellbeing (in the case of therapeutic judging). Indeed, therapeutic jurisprudence in problem-
solving courts relies on the judge developing an ongoing personal relationship of honesty, trust and 
rapport with the offender. Feminist judging may or may not involve an ethic of care: An ethic of care 
is certainly consistent with feminist judging, but its absence does not belie a feminist approach. 
The focus of conventional judging is on the law and the judicial role. Litigants are regarded in 
abstract, categorical terms; thus a defendant in criminal proceedings is someone whose personal 
circumstances may only be relevant to the extent that they may operate as aggravating or 
mitigating factors in the sentencing calculus. The focus of procedural justice in a criminal matter, on 
the other hand, is on the dignity of the defendant, who is regarded as a subject who deserves to 
feel included, heard and understood, and whose experience of the judicial process matters, 
ZKDWHYHUWKHUHVXOWPD\EH7KHUDSHXWLFMXULVSUXGHQFHIRFXVHVRQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VZHOIDUHDQG
psychological wellbeing. She or he is regarded as an individual situated in unfortunate 
circumstances, who has the capacity to work to change his or her life. Therapeutic jurisprudence is 
about developing the moral self as indicated by compliance with the treatment regime, assisted by 
advice, guidance, motivation and inspiration from the judge and the interdisciplinary experts. Like 
therapeutic jurisprudence, feminist judging sees the defendant as an individual situated in a 
SDUWLFXODUFRQWH[WEXWLWODFNVWKHUDSHXWLFMXULVSUXGHQFH¶VPRUDOJRDOV)HPLQLVWMXGJLQJVHHVWKH
problems for individuals before the court as located in law and in society ² i.e. as political, the 
product of systemic power differentials ² UDWKHUWKDQLQWKHRIIHQGHU¶VSHUVRQDOFKRLFHVDQGWKXVLW
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is more likely to seek empowerment for those who have been disempowered rather than individual 
moral reform. Its focus is also broader, taking in not only the defendant but also the victim,9 family 
members, and the wider social, cultural and economic context. 
There is scope for overlap between feminist judging, procedural justice and therapeutic 
jurisprudence, in that feminist judging may incorporate a procedurally just approach (while 
incorporating other feminist elements as well), and feminist judicial officers may incorporate 
therapeutic goals and practices. For example, in Australia, some feminist magistrates sit in 
specialist domestic violence courts, and have also been involved in the establishment of other 
problem-solving courts such as drug courts and Koori/Murri courts (see, for example, Auty, 2006; 
Hennessy, 2007; Hunter, 2004; King and Auty, 2005; Previtera, 2006). But a feminist judicial officer 
with a therapeutic orientation may also be aware of the dangers of trying to be too interventionist or 
maternalist and thinking that she and the experts know best, rather than acknowledging and 
validating the defendant¶Vexpertise in her own life.  
 
Practice 
At the level of practice, while it should be possible to distinguish between more conventional and 
newer approaches to judging, it may be difficult to distinguish among the latter. For example, a key 
performance element in the newer approaches to judging is more direct judicial interaction with 
court users, as opposed to the detachment of conventional judging. This entails treating those 
before the courts with respect and dignity, acknowledging them as individuals rather than as a type, 
being concerned about their welfare, explaining the process, actively interacting with and listening 
to participants, engaging in direct dialogue with them and being less formal and impersonal than 
more traditionally-oriented judicial officers (King et al., 2014; Mack and Roach Anleu, 2011). This 
will require different judicial communication skills and perhaps greater emotional capacities such as 
empathy and compassion (Henderson, 1987; see also Acorn, 2004; Avgoustinos, 2007; Bandes, 
2009; Massaro, 1989). At the same time, it may be difficult to tell whether the philosophy behind 
these practices is procedural justice, therapeutic jurisprudence or feminism.  
Potentially the only way to distinguish between procedural justice and feminist judicial practices 
would be by reference to the context and content of the judicial performance. If the judge actively 
engaged with all defendants without more, that would appear to be a procedural justice approach. 
If the judge took a holistic view of the situation of all defendants and attempted to identify and 
address underlying problems, that would appear to be a therapeutic jurisprudence approach. If the 
                                                          
9 Therapeutic jurisprudence might also, in theory, EHFRQFHUQHGZLWKODZ¶Vtherapeutic or anti-therapeutic 
effects on victims, however the therapeutic jurisprudence literature tends not to focus on victims and when 
it does, suggests that it is the responsibility of other parts of the criminal justice system, such as police and 
prosecutors, rather than judges, to take responsibility for victim wellbeing (for example Winick, 2008-
2009).  
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case involved a woman defendant or complainant or otherwise involved a gender or feminist issue, 
and the judge took steps to protect the complainant and/or affirm her experience, to understand the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V SDUWLFXODU FLUFXPVWDQFHV WR FRQGHPn male violence, and/or to combat gender 
stereotypes, that would appear to be a feminist approach.  
Table 1 summarises the similarities and differences identified in this section. 
Table 1 about here > 
 
7. Conclusion 
These accounts of approaches to judging in the lower courts demonstrate that feminist judging 
clearly differs from other approaches to judging, but in ways which may be difficult to discern in 
terms of observable judicial performance. Therapeutic jurisprudence and feminism have most in 
common in terms of embracing substantive goals, taking a more critical view of law, (potential) 
deployment of the ethic of care, and judicial engagement, compassion and empathy. Both appear 
to incorporate procedural justice but go beyond it. However, therapeutic jurisprudence is still 
individualistic and moralistic, while feminist judging takes a more structural view. On the other 
KDQGWKHUDSHXWLFMXULVSUXGHQFHLQWKHVHQVHRISURPRWLQJSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ZHOOEHLQJDQGPLQLPLsing 
the harms caused by the legal system, is arguably applicable to a wide range of cases, whereas 
feminist judging might be more limited in scope. 
This is not to suggest that, because of their substantive goals, therapeutic jurisprudence and 
feminist judging as practices in the lower courts risk violating norms of judicial decision-making. 
Fidelity to judicial legitimacy, understood as impartiality, neutrality, application of law and following 
legal procedures, remains central to all approaches to judging in courts at all levels, and indeed, 
WKHFRQYHQWLRQDODSSURDFKWRLPSOHPHQWLQJWKHVHYDOXHVH[HUWVFRQVLGHUDEOHµJUDYLWDWLRQDOSXOO¶
over all approaches to judging.10 However, newer forms of judging challenge the assumption in 
conventional judging philosophy that these values can only be performed in specific, limited ways. 
Indeed, proponents of feminist judging have argued that a feminist approach is likely to be more 
fair and truly impartial than conventional judging, because it overcomes conventional partiality 
towards masculine experience and perspectives (Hale, 2007; Hunter, 2008a, 2015b).  
This article provides a detailed analysis and comparison of ways the four approaches to judging 
PLJKWPDQLIHVWLQORZHUFRXUWSUDFWLFHDVµLGHDOW\SHV¶EXWWKHVHGLVWLQFWLRQVPD\QRWEHVRVKDUSRU
so readily perceptible in actual courtroom processes. Versions of procedural justice and 
therapeutic jurisprudence might be weak or minimal. Implementation of philosophical ideals may be 
inconsistent, perhaps due to the constraints of the forum, the type of matter and/or the way 
                                                          
10 We are grateful to Professor Margaret Davies for the suggestion of tKHPHWDSKRURIµJUDYLWDWLRQDOSXOO¶ in 
this context (see also Cooper, 2001). 
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participants interact with the judge. Judicial philosophies may be more or less consciously pursued. 
Nonetheless, conceptually differentiating these four approaches to judging in the lower court 
context, and identifying key similarities and differences, provides an essential foundation on which 
to further specify and extend understandings of the scope and nature of feminist judging beyond 
the higher courts. 
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Table 1: Comparing approaches to judging  
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